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ABSTRACT
Although Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is an influential
logical framework for representing and reasoning about in-
formation change, little is known about the computational
complexity of its associated decision problems. In fact, we
only know that for public announcement logic, a fragment
of DEL, the satisfiability problem and the model-checking
problem are respectively PSPACE-complete and in P. We
contribute to fill this gap by proving that for the DEL lan-
guage with event models, the model-checking problem is,
surprisingly, PSPACE-complete. Also, we prove that the
satisfiability problem is NEXPTIME-complete. In doing so,
we provide a sound and complete tableau method deciding
the satisfiability problem.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.4 [Knowledge representation formalisms and meth-
ods]: Modal logic; F.1.3 [Complexity measure and classes]:
Reducibility and completeness
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Dynamic epistemic logic, computational complexity, model
checking, satisfiability
1. INTRODUCTION
Research fields like distributed artificial intelligence, dis-
tributed computing and game theory all deal with groups of
human or non-human agents which interact, exchange and
receive information. The problems they address range from
multi-agent planning and design of distributed protocols to
strategic decision making in groups. In order to address ap-
propriately and rigorously these problems, it is necessary to
be able to provide formal means for representing and reason-
ing about such interactions and flows of information. The
framework of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL for short) is
very well suited to this aim. Indeed, it is a logical frame-
work where one can represent and reason about beliefs and
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knowledge change of multiple agents, and more generally
about information change.
The theoretical work of the above mentioned research
fields has already been applied to various practical problems
stemming from telecommunication networks, World Wide
Web, peer to peer networks, aircraft control systems, and so
on. . . In general, in all applied contexts, the investigation of
the algorithmic aspects of the formalisms employed plays an
important role in determining whether and to what extent
they can be applied. For this reason, the algorithmic aspects
of DEL need to be studied.
To this aim, a preliminary step consists in studying the
computational properties of its main associated decision prob-
lems, namely the model checking problem and the satisfia-
bility problem. Indeed, it will indirectly provide algorithmic
methods to solve these decision problems and give us a hint
of whether and to what extent our methods can be applied.
However, surprisingly little is known about the computa-
tional complexity of these problems. We only know that
for public announcement logic, a fragment of DEL [Plaza,
1989], the model checking problem is in P and the satisfi-
ability problem is PSPACE-complete. Here, we aim to fill
this gap for the full language of DEL with event models.
DEL is built on top of epistemic logic. An epistemic model
represents how a given set of agents perceive the actual world
in terms of beliefs and knowledge about this world and about
the other agents’ beliefs. The insight of the DEL approach
is that one can describe how an event is perceived by agents
in a very similar way: an agent’s perception of an event can
also be described in terms of beliefs and knowledge. For
example, at the battle of Waterloo, when marshal Blu¨cher
received the message of the duke of Wellington inviting him
to join the attack at dawn against Napoleon, Wellington did
not know at that very moment that Blu¨cher was receiving
his message, and Blu¨cher knew it. This is a typical example
of announcement which is not public. This led Baltag, Moss
and Solecki to introduce the notion of event model [Baltag
et al., 1998]. The definition of an event model, denoted
(M′, w′), is very similar to the definition of an epistemic
model. They also introduced a product update, which defines
a new epistemic model representing the situation after the
event. Then, they extended the epistemic language with
dynamic operators [M′, w′]ϕ standing for ‘ϕ holds after the
occurrence of the event represented by (M′, w′)’.
Using the so-called reduction axioms, it turns out that
any formula with dynamic operator(s) can be translated
to an equivalent epistemic formula without dynamic oper-
ator. As a first approximation, we could be tempted to
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use these reduction axioms to reduce both the model check-
ing problem and the satisfiability problem of DEL to the
model checking problem and the satisfiability problem of
epistemic logic, because optimal algorithmic methods al-
ready exist for these related problems. However, the re-
duction algorithm induced by the reduction axioms is expo-
nential in the size of the input formula. Therefore, for the
satisfiability problem, we only obtain an algorithm which is
in EXPSPACE (because the satisfiability problem of epis-
temic logic is PSPACE-complete), and for the model check-
ing problem, we only obtain an algorithm which is in EX-
PTIME (because the model checking problem of epistemic
logic is in P). These algorithms are not optimal because, as
we shall see, there exists an algorithm solving the satisfiabil-
ity problem which is in NEXPTIME⊆ EXPSPACE and also
an algorithm solving the model checking problem which is in
PSPACE⊆ EXPTIME. Our algorithm for solving the satis-
fiability problem is based on a sound and complete tableau
method which does not resort to the reduction axioms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we re-
call the core of the DEL framework and the different vari-
ants of languages with event models which have been in-
troduced in the literature. In Section 3, we prove that
the model checking problem of DEL is PSPACE-complete,
and in Section 4 we prove that the satisfiability problem
is NEXPTIME-complete. In Section 5, we discuss related
works and whether our results still hold when we extend the
expressiveness of the language with common belief and ‘star’
iteration operators. We conclude in Section 6.
2. DYNAMIC EPISTEMIC LOGIC
Following the methodology of DEL, we split the exposi-
tion of the DEL logical framework into three subsections. In
Section 2.1, we recall the syntax and semantics of the epis-
temic language. In Section 2.2, we define event models, and
in Section 2.3, we define the product update. In Section 2.4,
we recall the different languages that have been introduced
in the DEL literature and we introduce our language LDEL.
2.1 Epistemic language
In the rest of the paper, ATM is a countable set of atomic
propositions and AGT is a finite set of agents.
A (pointed) epistemic model (M, w) represents how the
actual world represented by w is perceived by the agents.
Intuitively, in this definition, vRau means that in world v
agent a considers that world u might be the actual world.
Definition 1 (Epistemic model).
An epistemic model is a tuple M = (W,R, V ) where W
is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R maps each agent
a ∈ AGT to a relation Ra ⊆ W ×W and V : ATM → 2W
is a function called a valuation. We abusively write w ∈ M
for w ∈ W and we say that (M, w) is a pointed epistemic
model. We also write v ∈ Ra(w) for wRav.
Then, we define the following epistemic language LEL. It
can be used to state properties of epistemic models:
Definition 2 (Epistemic language).
The language LEL of epistemic logic is defined as follows:
LEL : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Baϕ
where p ranges over ATM and a ranges over AGT. A for-
mula of LEL is called an epistemic formula. The formula ⊥
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Figure 1: Pointed epistemic models (M, w) (left),
((M ⊗ M′1), (w,w′1)) (center) and (M ⊗ M′1 ⊗
M′2, (w,w′1, w′2)) (right)
is an abbreviation for p ∧ ¬p, and  is an abbreviation for
¬⊥. The formula 〈Ba〉ϕ is an abbreviation of ¬Ba¬ϕ. The
size of a formula ϕ ∈ LEL is defined by induction as follows:
|p| = 1; |¬ϕ| = 1+|ϕ|; |ϕ∧ψ| = 1+|ϕ|+|ψ|; |Baϕ| = 1+|ϕ|.
Intuitively, the formula Baϕ reads as ‘agent a believes that
ϕ holds in the current situation’.
Definition 3 (Truth conditions).
Given an epistemic model M = (W,R, V ) and a formula
ϕ ∈ LEL, we define inductively the satisfaction relation |=⊆
W × LEL as follows: for all w ∈ W ,
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff not M, w |= ϕ
M, w |= Baϕ iff for all v ∈ Ra(w), we have M, v |= ϕ
We write M |= ϕ when for all w ∈ M, it holds that M, w |=
ϕ. Also, we write |= ϕ, and we say that ϕ is valid, when for
all epistemic model M, it holds that M |= ϕ. Dually, we
say that ϕ is satisfiable when ¬ϕ is not valid.
Example 1. Our running example is inspired by the co-
ordinated attack problem from the distributed systems folk-
lore [Fagin et al., 1995]. Our set of atomic propositions is
ATM = {p} and our set of agents is AGT = {1, 2}. Agent
1 is the duke of Wellington and agent 2 is marshal Blu¨cher;
p stands for ‘Wellington wants to attack at dawn’. The ini-
tial situation is represented in Figure 1 by the pointed epis-
temic model (M, w) = ({w, u}, R1 = {(w,w), (u, u)}, R2 =
{(w,w), (w, u)}, V (p) = {w}). In this pointed epistemic
model, it holds that M, w |= p∧B1p: Wellington ‘knows’ that
he wants to attack at dawn. It also holds that M, w |= ¬B2p:
Blu¨cher does not ‘know’ that Wellington wants to attack
at dawn; and M, w |= B1¬B2p: Wellington ‘knows’ that
Blu¨cher does not ‘know’ that he wants to attack at dawn.
2.2 Event model
A (pointed) event model (M′, w′) represents how the ac-
tual event represented by w′ is perceived by the agents. In-
tuitively, in this definition, u′R′av
′ means that while the pos-
sible event represented by u′ is occurring, agent a considers
possible that the event represented by v′ is in fact occurring.
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Figure 2: Pointed event models (M′1, w′1) (left) and
(M′2, w′2) (right)
Definition 4 (Event model).
An event model is a tuple M′ = (W ′, R′, P re) where W ′ is
a non-empty and finite set of possible events, R′ maps each
agent a ∈ AGT to a relation R′a ⊆ W ′×W ′ and Pre : W ′ →
LEL is a function that maps each event to a precondition
expressed in the epistemic language.
We abusively write w′ ∈ M′ for w′ ∈ W ′ and we say
that (M′, w′) is a pointed event model. The size of an event
model M′ = (W ′, R′, P re) is noted |M′| and is defined as
follows: card(W ′) +
∑
a∈AGT card(R
′
a) +
∑
w′∈W ′ |Pre(w′)|.
Example 2. In Figure 2 are represented two pointed event
models. The first, (M1, w′1) = ({w′1, u′1}, R1 = {(w′1, u′1),
(u′1, u
′
1)}, R2 = {(w′1, w′1), (u′1, u′1)}, P re, w′1) where Pre(w′1)
= p and Pre(u′1) = , represents the event whereby Blu¨cher
receives the message of Wellington that he wants to attack at
dawn. When this happens, Wellington believes that nothing
happens and believes that this is even common knowledge.
The second, (M2, w′2) = ({w′2, u′2}, R1 = {(w′2, w′2), (u′2, u′2)},
R2 = {(w′2, u′2), (u′2, u′2)}, P re, w′2), where Pre(w′2) = B2p
and Pre(u′2) = , represents the event whereby Wellington
receives the message of Blu¨cher telling him that he ‘knows’
that Wellington wants to attack at dawn.
2.3 Product update
The following product update yields a new pointed epis-
temic model M⊗M′, (w,w′) representing how the new sit-
uation which was previously represented by (M, w) is per-
ceived by the agents after the occurrence of the event rep-
resented by (M′, w′).
Definition 5 (Product update).
Let M = (W,R, V ) be an epistemic model and let M′ =
(W ′, R′, P re) be an event model. The product update of M
by M′ is the epistemic model M ⊗ M′ = (W ′′, R′′, V ′′)
defined as follows (p and a range over ATM and AGT re-
spectively):
W ′′ ={(w,w′) ∈ W ×W ′ | M, w |= Pre(u′)}
R′′a ={〈(w,w′), (v, v′)〉 ∈ W ′′ ×W ′′ | wRav and w′R′av′}
V ′′(p) ={(w,w′) ∈ W ′′ | w ∈ V (p)}
Given a pointed epistemic model (M, w), and a pointed
event model (M′, w′), we say that (M′, w′) is executable in
(M, w) when M, w |= Pre(w′). If M is an epistemic model
and M′1, . . . ,M′n are event models, we abusively write M⊗
M′1 ⊗ · · ·⊗M′n for (. . . ((M⊗M′1)⊗M′2)⊗ . . .)⊗M′n and
(w,w′1, . . . , w
′
n) for (. . . ((w,w
′
1), w
′
2), . . .), w
′
n).
Example 3. The pointed epistemic models ((M⊗M′1),
(w,w′1)) and (M⊗M′1⊗M′2, (w,w′1, w′2)) are represented in
Figure 1. After Blu¨cher receives the message of Wellington,
Blu¨cher ‘knows’ that Wellington wants to attack at dawn,
but Wellington does not ‘know’ that Blu¨cher ‘knows’ it: M⊗
M′1, (w,w′1) |= p∧B2p∧¬B1B2p. Likewise, after Wellington
receives the message of Blu¨cher telling him that he ‘knows’
that he wants to attack at dawn (B2p), Wellington ‘knows’
that Blu¨cher ‘knows’ that he wants to attack at dawn, but
Blu¨cher does not ‘know’ that Wellington ‘knows’ it: M ⊗
M′1 ⊗ M′2, (w,w′1, w′2) |= p ∧ B2p ∧ B1B2p ∧ ¬B2B1B2p.
Hence, in particular, M, w |= ¬[M′1, w′1][M′2, w′2]B2B1B2p.
2.4 Languages of DEL
In [Baltag et al., 1998], the language is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Baϕ | [M′, w′]ϕ
where p ranges over ATM , a over AGT and (M′, w′) is any
pointed and finite event model. The formula 〈M′, w′〉ϕ is
an abbreviation for ¬[M′, w′]¬ϕ.
Intuitively, [M′, w′]ϕ reads as ‘ϕ will hold after the occur-
rence of the event represented by (M′, w′)’ and 〈M′, w′〉ϕ
reads as ‘the event represented by (M′, w′) is executable in
the current situation and ϕ will hold after its execution’.
However, note that in this definition, preconditions of
event models are necessarily epistemic formulas. In [Baltag
and Moss, 2004], another language is introduced which can
deal with event models whose preconditions may involve for-
mulas with event models. This language relies on the notion
of event signature and the epistemic language is extended
with a modality [Σ, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn]ϕ, where Σ is an event signa-
ture. The language of [Baltag and Moss, 2004] also includes
PDL-like program constructions such as sequential composi-
tion, union and ‘star’ operation of event models (see Section
5 for a definition of these program constructions).
In [van Ditmarsch et al., 2007], preconditions can also
be formulas involving event models, but only union of pro-
grams is allowed. It is therefore a fragment of the language
of [Baltag and Moss, 2004] since it does not include sequen-
tial composition nor the ‘star’ operation. This will be our
language in this paper.
Definition 6 ([van Ditmarsch et al., 2007]).
The language LDEL is the union of the formulas ϕ ∈ Lstat⊗
and the events (or epistemic events) π ∈ Ldyn⊗ defined by
the following rule:
Lstat⊗ : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Baϕ | [π]ϕ
Ldyn⊗ : π ::= M′, w′ | (π ∪ π)
where p ranges over ATM , a over AGT and (M′, w′) is
any pointed and finite event model such that for all w′ ∈
M′, Pre(w′) is a formula of Lstat⊗ that has already been
constructed in a previous stage of the inductively defined
hierarchy.
The size of ϕ ∈ LDEL is defined as for the epistemic lan-
guage together with the induction case |[π]ϕ| = 1+ |π|+ |ϕ|
where |M′, w′| = |M′|, and |π ∪ γ| = 1 + |π|+ |γ|.
Definition 7 (Truth conditions).
Given an epistemic model M = (W,R, V ) and a formula
ϕ ∈ LDEL, we define inductively the satisfaction relation
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|=⊆ W × LDEL as follows:
M, w |= [M′, w′]ϕ iff M, w |= Pre(w′) implies
M⊗M′, (w,w′) |= ϕ
M, w |= [π ∪ γ]ϕ iff M, w |= [π]ϕ and M, w |= [γ]ϕ.
The other induction steps are identical to the induction steps
of Definition 3.
The results in this paper are the same whether or not the
formulas of the preconditions involve event models. How-
ever, the result of NEXPTIME-completeness of the satisfi-
ability problem of Section 4 holds only if we consider union
of event models as a program construction in the language.
3. MODEL CHECKING PROBLEM
The model checking problem of LDEL is defined as follows:
Input: a pointed epistemic model (M, w) and a for-
mula ϕ ∈ LDEL;
Output: yes iff M, w |= ϕ.
Whereas the model checking problem with an epistemic
formula of LEL is in P, model checking with a formula of
LDEL is surprisingly PSPACE-complete. This shows that
the addition of dynamic modalities with event models to
LEL increases tremendously the computational complexity
of the model checking problem.
3.1 Upper bound
In Figure 3 is defined a deterministic algorithm M-Check(
w M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i , ϕ) that checks whether we have
M⊗M′1 ⊗ . . .M′i, (w,w′1, . . . , w′i) |= ϕ, where (M, w) is a
pointed epistemic model and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, (M′j , w′j)
is a pointed event model. The precondition of a call to
the function M-Check(w M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i , ϕ) is that
(w,w′1, . . . , w
′
i) ∈ M ⊗ M′1 ⊗ . . .M′i, that is, the sequence
(M′1, w′1) . . . , (M′i, w′i) is executable in (M, w). In order to
check whether M, w |= ϕ, we just call M-Check(w,ϕ).
Theorem 1. The model checking problem of LDEL is in
PSPACE.
Proof sketch. Termination and correction of the algo-
rithm M-Check are easily proved over the size of the input
defined by |M|+
i∑
k=1
|M′k|+ |ϕ|. As for complexity, the al-
gorithm requires a polynomial amount of space in the size
of the input. Indeed, as the size of the input is strictly de-
creasing at each recursive call, the number of recursive calls
in the call stack is linear in the size of the input. Then, each
of the current call requires a polynomial amount of space in
the size of the input for storing the value of local variables:
the most consuming case is Baψ where we have to save all
the current values of u, u1, . . . , ui in the loop for.
3.2 Lower bound
We prove that the algorithm of the previous section is
optimal. To do so, we provide a polynomial reduction of the
quantified Boolean formula satisfiability problem, known to
be PSPACE-complete [Papadimitriou, 1995, p. 455] to the
model-checking problem of LDEL.
function M-Check(w M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i ϕ)
match (ϕ)
case p:
return w ∈ V (p);
case ¬ψ:
return not M-Check(w M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i ψ);
case ψ1 ∧ ψ2:
return (M-Check(w M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i ψ1) and
M-Check(w M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i ψ2));
case Baψ:
for u ∈ Ra(w)
for u′1 ∈ R′a(w′1)
if M-Check(u, Pre(u′1))
...
for u′i ∈ R′a(w′i)
if M-Check(u M′1, u′1; . . . ;M′i−1, u′i−1 Pre(u′i))
if not M-Check(u M′1, u′1; . . . ;M′i, u′i ψ);
return false ;
endIf
endIf endFor . . . endIf endFor endFor
return true ;
case [M′, w′]ψ:
if M-Check(w M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i Pre(w′))
return M-Check(w M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i;M′, w′ ψ);
endIf
return true ;
case [π ∪ γ]ψ:
return (M-Check(w M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i [π]ψ) and
M-Check(w M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i [γ]ψ));
endMatch
endFunction
Figure 3: PSPACE algorithm for model checking
Theorem 2. The model checking problem of LDEL is
PSPACE-hard.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we only consider in
this proof quantified Boolean formulas of the form ∀p1∃p2∀p3
. . . ∀p2k−1∃p2kψ(p1, . . . p2k), where ψ(p1, . . . , p2k) is a Boolean
formula over the atomic propositions p1, . . . , p2k. The for-
mula ∀p1∃p2∀p3 . . . ∀p2k−1∃p2kψ(p1, . . . p2k) is satisfiable iff
for both truth values of the atomic proposition p1 there is a
truth value for the atomic proposition p2 such that for both
truth values of the atomic proposition p3, and so on up to
p2k, the formula ψ(p1, . . . p2k) is true in the overall truth
assignment.
We can restrict ourselves to LDEL where there is only
one agent a. The quantified Boolean formula satisfiability
problem is defined as follows:
Input: a natural number k and a quantified Boolean
formula ϕ  ∀p1∃p2∀p3 . . . ∀p2k−1∃p2kψ(p1, . . . , p2k);
Output: yes iff ϕ is satisfiable.
Let ϕ = ∀p1∃p2∀p3 . . . ∀p2k−1∃p2kψ(p1, . . . p2k) be a quanti-
fied Boolean formula. We define a pointed epistemic model
(M, w0), 2k pointed event models (M′1, w′01 ), . . . , (M′2k, w′02k),
a pointed event model M′, w′0 and an epistemic formula ψ′
that are computable in polynomial time in the size of ϕ such
that:
ϕ is satisfiable in quantified Boolean logic
iff
M, w0 |= [M′1, w′01 ∪M′, w′0 ]〈M′2, w′02 ∪M′, w′0 〉 . . .
[M′2k−1, w′02k−1 ∪M′, w′0 ]〈M′2k, w′02k ∪M′, w′0 〉ψ′.
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The corresponding instance of the model checking problem
of LDEL is computable in polynomial time in the size of ϕ.
Now, let us describe M, w0, the event models M′1, w′01 , . . . ,
M′2k, w′02k, the event model M′, w′0 and ψ′.
• M = (W,R, V ) is defined by:
– W = {w0, w1, . . . , w2k+1};
– Ra = {(wj , wj+1 | j ∈ {0, . . . , 2k}};
– and V (p) = ∅ for all p ∈ ATM
• For all i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}, M′i = (W ′i , R′i, P rei) is defined
by:
– W ′i = {w′0i , w′1i , . . . , w′ii , w′i }
– Ri
′
a = {(w′ji , w′j+1i ) | j ∈ {0, . . . , i− 1}}∪{(w′0i , w′i ),
(w′i , w
′
i )}
– and Prei(u
′) =  for all u′ ∈ W ′i
• M′, w′0 = (W ′, R′, P re) is defined by:
– W ′ = {w′0}
– R′a = {(w′0 , w′0 )}
– Pre(w′0 ) = 
• ψ′ = ψ(p1 ← 〈Ba〉Ba⊥, . . . , p2k ← (〈Ba〉)2kBa⊥),
that is, ψ′ is the formula ψ where all pi occurrences
are substituted by (〈Ba〉)iBa⊥.1
The semantics is simulated in the following way. The
proposition pi is interpreted as the presence of a chain of
length exactly i from the root of a given epistemic model.
That is why in ψ′, the proposition pi is substituted by
(〈Ba〉)iBa⊥, which is true in the root of the final epistemic
model iff there exists a chain of length i in that model.
Note that updating an epistemic model where there is a
chain of length 2k + 1 by M′i, w′0i where i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}:
• preserves the presence or absence of any chain of length
j = i; in particular, it always preserves the presence of
the chain of length 2k + 1;
• adds a chain of length i, that is pi becomes true;
Note also that updating an epistemic model where there
is a chain of length 2k+1 by M′, w′0 preserves the presence
or absence of any chain. So, it will keep pi false if it was
already false and it will keep any pi true if it was already
true. In other words, the M′, w′0 is a neutral element for
the product update.
The crucial invariant property (Inv) of an epistemic model
is the existence of a chain of length 2k + 1 in any update of
M, w0 by any sequence of M′, w′0 and M′i, w′0i .
The behavior of ∀pi in quantified Boolean logic consists in
a universal choice of a truth value for pi. It is translated by
the update operator [M′i, w′0i ∪M′, w′0 ] whose semantics is
to choose universally the update of the epistemic model by
M′i, w′0i , that will give a new updated epistemic model with
a chain of length i, that is pi is true, or by M′, w′0 that
will let the new updated epistemic model without a chain of
length i, that is pi is false.
1The formula (〈Ba〉)iϕ is an abbreviation of 〈Ba〉 . . . 〈Ba〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
i times
ϕ.
The behavior of ∃pi in quantified Boolean logic consists in
an existential choice of a truth value for pi. It is translated
by the update operator 〈M′i, w′0i ∪M′, w′0 〉 whose semantics
is to choose existentially the update of the epistemic model
by M′i, w′0i , that will give a new updated epistemic model
with a chain of length i, that is pi is true, or by M′, w′0 ,
that will let the new updated epistemic model without a
chain of length i, that is pi is false.
Remark 1. Note that the reduction used to prove that the
model checking problem of LDEL is PSPACE-hard uses only
the precondition .
4. SATISFIABILITY PROBLEM
The satisfiability problem of LDEL is defined as follows:
Input: a formula ϕ ∈ LDEL;
Output: yes iff there exists a pointed epistemic model
(M, w) such that M, w |= ϕ.
The satisfiability problem is known to be decidable. Indeed,
the standard reduction axioms of DEL [Baltag and Moss,
2004, p. 214] induce a translation tr : LDEL → LEL such
that ϕ ∈ LDEL is satisfiable iff tr(ϕ) ∈ LEL is satisfiable.
Since the size of tr(ϕ) is at most exponential in the size
of ϕ [Lutz, 2006] and the satisfiability problem of LEL is
PSPACE-complete, the satisfiability problem of LDEL is in
EXPSPACE. This upper bound is nevertheless not optimal:
we are going to prove in this section that the satisfiability
problem of LDEL is NEXPTIME-complete.
4.1 Upper bound
In this subsection we present a tableau method that does
not rely on reduction axioms and we prove that it provides a
NEXPTIME procedure deciding the satisfiability problem.
4.1.1 Tableau method
Let Lab be a countable set of labels designed to represent
worlds of the epistemic model (M, w). Our tableau method
manipulates terms that we call tableau terms and they are
of the following kind:
• (σ M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i ϕ) where σ ∈ Lab is a node
(that represents a world in the initial model) and for
all j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, M′j , w′j is an event model. This term
means that ϕ is true in the world denoted by σ after
the execution of the sequence M′1, w′1, . . . ,M′i, w′i and
that the sequence is executable in the world denoted
by σ;
• (σ M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i ) means that the sequence
M′1, w′1, . . . ,M′i, w′i is executable in the world denoted
by σ;
• (σ M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i ⊗) means that the sequence
M′1, w′1, . . . ,M′i, w′i is not executable in the world de-
noted by σ;
• (σRaσ1) means that the world denoted by σ is linked
by Ra to the world denoted by σ1;
• ⊥ denotes an inconsistency.
A tableau rule is represented by a numerator N above a
line and a finite list of denominators D1, . . . ,Dk below this
line, separated by vertical bars:
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(σ Σ′ ϕ ∧ ψ)
(σ Σ′ ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ψ)
(∧) (σ Σ′ ¬¬ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ϕ)
(¬¬)
(σ Σ′ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))
(σ Σ′ ¬ϕ) | (σ Σ′ ¬ψ) (¬∧)
(σ Σ′ p)(σ Σ′ ¬p)
⊥ (⊥)
(σ Σ′ ¬[M′, w′]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ )
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ¬ϕ)
(¬[M′, w′])
(σ Σ′ [M′, w′]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ⊗) (σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ )
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ϕ)
([M′, w′])
(σ Σ′ p)
(σ  p)
(←p)
(σ Σ′ ¬p)
(σ  ¬p) (←¬p)
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ )
(σ Σ′ Pre(w′))
(σ Σ′ )
()
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ⊗)
(σ Σ′ )
(σ Σ′ ¬Pre(w′)) (σ Σ
′ ⊗)
(⊗)
(σ M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i Baϕ)
(σ Ra σ1) (Ba)
(σ1 M′1, u′1; . . . ;M′i, u′i )
(σ1 M′1, u′1; . . . ;M′i, u′i ϕ) (σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M′i, u′i ⊗)
(σ Σ′ ⊗)(σ Σ′ )
⊥ (clash,⊗)
(σ  ⊗)
⊥ (⊗)
(σ M′1, w′1; . . . ;M′i, w′i ¬Baϕ)
(σ Ra σnew)
(σnew M′1, u′1; . . . ;M′i, u′i )
(σnew M′1, u′1; . . . ;M′i, u′i ¬ϕ)
(¬Ba) (σ Σ
′ [π ∪ γ]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ [π]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ [γ]ϕ)
([π ∪ γ]) (σ Σ
′ ¬[π ∪ γ]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ¬[π]ϕ) |
(σ Σ′ ¬[γ]ϕ)
(¬[π ∪ γ])
Figure 4: Tableau rules
N
D1 | . . . | Dk
The numerator and the denominators are finite sets of
tableau terms.
A tableau tree is a finite tree with a set of tableau terms
at each node. A rule with numerator N and denominator
D is applicable to a node carrying a set Γ if Γ contains an
instance of N but not the instance of its denominator D. If
no rule is applicable, Γ is said to be saturated. We call a node
σ an end node if the set of formulas Γ it carries is saturated,
or if ⊥ ∈ Γ. The tableau tree is extended as follows:
1. Choose a leaf node n carrying Γ where n is not an end
node, and choose a rule ρ applicable to n.
2. (a) If ρ has only one denominator, add the appropri-
ate instantiation to Γ.
(b) If ρ has multiple denominators, choose one of them
and add to Γ the appropriate instantiation of this
denominator.
A branch in a tableau tree is a path from the root to
an end node. A branch is closed if its end node contains
⊥, otherwise it is open. A tableau tree is closed if all its
branches are closed, otherwise it is open. The tableau tree
for a formula ϕ ∈ LDEL is the tableau tree obtained from
the root {(σ0  ϕ)} when all leafs are end nodes. We write
 ϕ when the tableau for ¬ϕ is closed.
The tableau rules of our tableau method are represented
in Figure 4. In these rules, Σ′ is a list of pointed event mod-
els M′1, w′1, . . . ,M′i, w′i and  is the empty list. The tableau
method contains the classical Boolean rules (∧), (¬¬), (¬∧).
The rules (←p) and (←¬p) handle atomic propositions. The
rule (⊥) makes the current execution fail. The rule for (Ba)
is applied for all j ∈ {1, . . . i} and all u′j such that w′jR′au′j .
Similarly, the rule for (¬Ba) is applied by choosing non-
deterministically for all j ∈ {1, . . . i} some u′j such that
w′jR
′
au
′
j and creating a new fresh label σnew. The rules (),
(⊗), (clash,⊗) and (⊗) handle the preconditions. The last
two rules ([π∪ γ]) and (¬[π∪ γ]) handle the union operator.
Theorem 3 (Soundness and Completeness). Let ϕ
∈ LDEL. It holds that  ϕ iff |= ϕ.
Example 4. We prove with our tableau method that the
formula ϕ = ¬[M′1, w′1][M′2, w′2]B2B1B2p from Example 3
is satisfiable, where M′1, w′1 and M′2, w′2 are defined in Ex-
ample 2. In Figure 5, an open branch of the tableau tree
for ϕ is represented. The set Σ22 is saturated: no more
tableau rule is applicable. From this branch, we may extract
a pointed epistemic model (M, σ0) such that M, σ0 |= ϕ.
4.1.2 NEXPTIME-membership
Theorem 4. The satisfiability problem of LDEL is in NEX-
PTIME.
Proof sketch. Termination of our tableau method is
proved by defining the size of a term (σ Σ′ ϕ) by 1 +∑
(M′,w′)∈Σ′
(|M′| + 1) + |ϕ|. The depth of the tableau tree
is linear in the size of the input formula, but the number
of tableau terms at a node σ may be exponential, because
of rule (¬Ba). As a consequence, the tableau tree has at
most an exponential number of nodes and constructing non-
deterministically such a tree can been done in an exponential
amount of time. So, the procedure is in NEXPTIME.
4.2 Lower bound
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Σ0 := {(σ0  ϕ)}⏐⏐	 (¬[M′,w′])
Σ1 := Σ0 ∪
{
(σ0 M′1, w′1 )
(σ0 M′1, w′1¬[M′2, w′2]B2B1B2p)
}
⏐⏐	 ()
Σ2 := Σ1 ∪
{
(σ0  ), (σ0  p)
}⏐⏐	 (¬[M′,w′])
Σ3 := Σ2 ∪
{
(σ0 M′1, w′1;M′2, w′2 )
(σ0 M′1, w′1;M′2, w′2 ¬B2B1B2p)
}
⏐⏐	 ()
Σ4 := Σ3 ∪
{
(σ0 M′1, w′1 ), (σ0 M′1, w′1 B2p)
}⏐⏐	 (¬Ba)
Σ5 := Σ4 ∪
⎧⎨
⎩
(σ0 R2 σ1)
(σ1 M′1, w′1;M′2, u′2 )
(σ1 M′1, w′1;M′2, u′2 ¬B1B2p)
⎫⎬
⎭⏐⏐	 (Ba)
Σ6 := Σ5 ∪
{
(σ1 M′1, w′1 ), (σ1 M′1, w′1 p)
}⏐⏐	 ()
Σ7 := Σ6 ∪
{
(σ1 M′1, w′1 ), (σ1 M′1, w′1 ¬(p ∧ ¬p))
}⏐⏐	 (¬∧,¬¬)
Σ8 := Σ7 ∪
{
(σ1 M′1, w′1 p)
}⏐⏐	 (→p)
Σ9 := Σ8 ∪
{
(σ1  p)
}⏐⏐	 (¬Ba)
Σ10 := Σ9 ∪
⎧⎨
⎩
(σ1 R1 σ2)
(σ2 M′1, u′1;M′2, u′2 )
(σ2 M′1, u′1;M′2, u′2 ¬B2p)
⎫⎬
⎭⏐⏐	 ()
Σ11 := Σ10 ∪
{
(σ2 M′1, u′1 ), (σ2 M′1, u′1 ¬(p ∧ ¬p))
}⏐⏐	 (¬∧,¬¬)
Σ12 := Σ11 ∪
{
(σ2 M′1, u′1 p)
}⏐⏐	 (→p)
Σ13 := Σ12 ∪
{
(σ2  p)
}⏐⏐	 ()
Σ14 := Σ13 ∪
{
(σ2  ), (σ2  )
}⏐⏐	 (¬∧,¬¬)
Σ15 := Σ14 ∪
{
(σ2  p)
}⏐⏐	 (¬Ba)
Σ16 := Σ15 ∪
⎧⎨
⎩
(σ2 R2 σ3)
(σ3 M′1, u′1;M′2, u′2 )
(σ3 M′1, u′1;M′2, u′2 ¬p)
⎫⎬
⎭⏐⏐	 (→¬p)
Σ17 := Σ16 ∪
{
(σ3  ¬p)
}
⏐⏐	 ()
Σ18 := Σ17 ∪
{
(σ3 M′1, u′1 )
(σ3 M′1, u′1;M′2, u′2 ¬(p ∧ ¬p))
}
⏐⏐	 ()
Σ19 := Σ18 ∪
{
(σ3  ¬(p ∧ ¬p)
}⏐⏐	 (¬∧,¬¬)
Σ20 := Σ19 ∪
{
(σ3  ¬p)
}⏐⏐	 (¬∧,¬¬)
Σ21 := Σ20 ∪
{
(σ3 M′1, u′1;M′2, u′2 ¬p)
}⏐⏐	 (→¬p)
Σ22 := Σ21 ∪
{
(σ3  ¬p)
}
Figure 5: An open branch of the tableau for ϕ
We prove that the algorithm based on our tableau method
of the previous section is optimal in terms of computational
complexity. To do so, we prove that the satisfiability prob-
lem of LDEL is NEXPTIME-hard by reducing a NEXPTIME-
complete tiling problem to it [Boas, 1997].
Let C be a countable and infinite set of colors. A tile
type t is a 4-tuple of colors, denoted t = (left(t), right(t),
up(t), down(t)) ∈ C4. We consider the following tiling prob-
lem:
Input: a finite set T of tile types, t0 ∈ T and a natural
number k written in its binary form.
Output: yes iff there exists a function τ from {0, . . . k}2
to T satisfying the following constraints:
τ(0, 0) = t0; (1)
for all x ∈ {0, . . . , k} and y ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}:
up(τ(x, y)) = down(τ(x, y + 1)); (2)
for all x ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and y ∈ {0, . . . , k}:
right(τ(x, y)) = left(τ(x+ 1, y)). (3)
In other words, the problem is to decide whether we can
tile a (k+1)× (k+1) grid with the tile types of T , t0 being
placed onto (0, 0).
Theorem 5. The satisfiability problem of LDEL is NEX-
PTIME -hard.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that k =
2n. Let us consider an instance of the NEXPTIME-hard
tiling problem described above. Our goal is to provide a
polynomial translation from this instance to an instance of
the satisfiability problem of LDEL.
The idea is to embed two identical k × k-tilings into a
single tree. Each leaf of the tree represents both a position
(x1, y1) in the first tiling and a position (x2, y2) in the second
tiling. We need to encode two identical tilings because, in
order to check constraints 2 and 3, we will need to refer to
the tile located to the right or to the left of a given position
in a tiling, and also to refer to the tile located above or below
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it. This is hardly possible if we encode a single tiling at the
leafs of a tree, because we would need to ‘backtrack’ in the
tree to access these other positions.
We start by showing how to encode two identical tilings
at the leafs of a tree. Then we will show how to express the
three constraints 1, 2 and 3 in the definition of a tiling.
1. The coordinates (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) of the two tilings
are represented by the valuations of atomic propositions
p0, . . . , p4n−1. More precisely, the set X1 = {p0, . . . , pn−1}
contains the atomic propositions encoding the binary rep-
resentation of the integer x1, Y1 = {pn, . . . , p2n−1} con-
tains the atomic propositions encoding the binary repre-
sentation of the integer y1, X2 = {p2n, . . . , p3n−1} contains
the atomic propositions encoding the binary representation
of the integer x2, and Y2 = {p3n, . . . , p4n−1} contains the
atomic propositions encoding the binary representation of
the integer y2. For instance, for n = 4, the coordinates
(x1, y1) = (4, 3) and (x2, y2) = (11, 2) are represented at a
leaf of the tree by the following valuation. We recall that in
binary notation, 4 is represented by 100, 3 is represented by
11, 12 is represented by 1100 and 2 is represented by 10.
¬p0, p1,¬p2,¬p3︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
¬p4,¬p5, p6, p7︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
p8, p9,¬p10,¬p11︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
¬p12,¬p13, p14,¬p15︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
We then encode the existence of all valuations over X1 ∪
Y1 ∪X2 ∪ Y2 with the following formula:∧
l<4n
Bla
(
〈Ba〉pl ∧ 〈Ba〉¬pl∧
∧
i<l
((pi → Bapi) ∧ (¬pi → Ba¬pi))
)
. (4)
Formula 4 is true at a pointed epistemic model iff this pointed
epistemic model is bisimilar up to modal depth 4n to a bi-
nary tree of depth 4n whose leafs contain all the possible
valuations associated to p0, . . . , p4n−1.
In order to check Constraints 2 and 3 in the definition of
a tiling, we will need to refer to the tile located to the right
or to the left of a given position in a tiling, and also to refer
to the tile located above or below it. The following formulas
encode the fact that any pair of coordinates (x1, x2) and
(y1, y2) of the two tilings satisfy the properties x1 = x2,
x1 = x2 + 1, y1 = y2 and y1 = y2 + 1 respectively:
(x1 = x2) 
∧
i<n
(pi ↔ pi+2n) (5)
(y1 = y2) 
∧
n≤i<2n
(pi ↔ pi+2n) (6)
(x1 = x2 + 1) 
∨
i<n
(∧
j<i
(pj+2n ↔ pj) ∧ ¬pi+2n ∧ pi
∧
∧
i<j<n
(pj+2n ∧ ¬pj)
)
(7)
(y1 = y2 + 1) 
∨
n≤i<2n
( ∧
n≤j<i
(pj+2n ↔ pj) ∧ ¬pi+2n ∧ pi
∧
∧
i<j<2n
(pj+2n ∧ ¬pj)
)
(8)
The tile types of the first tiling are represented by atomic
propositions 1t and the tile types of the second tiling are
represented by atomic propositions 2t′ , where t and t
′ range
over T . They hold at a leaf of the tree whose coordinates
correspond to (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) when the tile type of the
first tiling at coordinate (x1, y1) is t and the tile type of the
second tiling at coordinate (x2, y2) is t
′.
Formulas 9 and 10 below encode the fact that, at each leaf
of the tree, there is exactly one tile type for the first tiling and
exactly one tile type for the second tiling. Formula 11 below
encodes the fact that when these two pairs of coordinates
coincide, that is when x1 = x2 and y1 = y2, then the tile
type of the first tiling and the tile type of the second tiling
are identical.
B4na
(∨
t∈T
1t ∧
∨
t∈T
2t
)
(9)
B4na
∧{
(1t → ¬1t′) ∧ (2t → ¬2t′) | t, t′ ∈ T, t = t′
}
(10)
B4na
(
(x1 = x2) ∧ (y1 = y2) →
∧
t∈T
(1t ↔ 2t)
)
(11)
However, it may be the case that in the tree, two differ-
ent leafs with the same valuation have different tile types.
Therefore, we also have to constrain the tree so that the leafs
denoting the same position in the first tiling (resp. second
tiling) contain the same tile type for the first tiling (resp.
second tiling). This is expressed by the following two for-
mulas:
[M′p0 ∪M′¬p0 ] . . . [M′p2n−1 ∪M′¬p2n−1 ]
∨
t∈T
B4na 1t (12)
[M′p2n ∪M′¬p2n ] . . . [M′p4n−1 ∪M′¬p4n−1 ]
∨
t∈T
B4na 2t (13)
where for a given a literal 
 (p or ¬p), the pointed event
model M′ = (W ′, R′, P re, w′0) is defined as follows: W ′ =
{w′i | i ∈ {0, . . . , 4n}}; R′a = {(w′i, w′i+1) | i ∈ {0, . . . , 4n− 1}};
and Pre(w′i) =  for all i < 4n and Pre(w′4n) = 
.
In formula 12, the sequence of pointed event models [M′p0∪M′¬p0 ] . . . [M′p2n−1 ∪ M′¬p2n−1 ] non-deterministically picks
a valuation v over X1 ∪ Y1 and selects the branches of the
tree whose leafs satisfy this valuation. Then, the formula∨
t∈T B
4n
a 1t checks that these leafs, which denote the same
position in the first tiling, are of the same tile type t. Like-
wise with formula 13 for the second tiling.
So, with formulas 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, we have encoded
in the tree two identical tilings in a single tree. Importantly,
note that the tree is defined so that each leaf refers to two
coordinates of the tiling, which can possibly be identical or
consecutive. It is this feature which will allow us to express
that constraints 2 and 3 of the definition of a tiling hold.
2. Constraints 1, 2 and 3 of the definition of a tiling are
expressed respectively by the following formulas:
B4na
(( ∧
i<4n
¬pi
)
→ t0
)
(14)
B4na
(
(x1 = x2) ∧ (y1 = y2 + 1) (15)
→
∧
t∈T
{
1t →
∨{
2t′ | t′ ∈ T, down(t′) = up(t)
}})
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B4na
(
(x1 = x2 + 1) ∧ (y1 = y2) (16)
→
∧
t∈T
{
1t →
∨{
2t′ | t′ ∈ T, left(t′) = right(t)
}})
As we said at the beginning of the proof, these two con-
straints motivate the need to encode two tilings: for a given
position in a tiling, we need to refer to the tile located to the
right or to the left of it, and to refer to the tile located above
or below it. This would not be possible with our epistemic
language if the tiling was encoded by a single tree.
One can then check that there exists a tiling for the in-
stance of the tiling problem iff the formula ϕ, which is the
conjunction of fomulas 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 is
satisfiable in LDEL.
3. Finally, we show that the reduction is polynomial in
the size of the instance of the tiling problem. The formula of
Equation 4 is of size O(n2). The formulas of Equations 12,
13 are of size O(n2+ |T |×n). The other formulas are clearly
of size polynomial in the size of the input, so the result
follows. Importantly, note that if we decided to rewrite the
formulas 12 and 13 without using the union operator ∪, then
the corresponding formula would be exponential in the size
of the input. So, the use of the union operator is really
crucial in order to have a polynomial reduction from the
tiling problem to our satisfiability problem.
5. RELATED WORK
5.1 Theory
There exists a terminating tableau method solving the
satisfiability problem of LDEL [Hansen, 2010]. This method
writes subformulas by applying the reduction axioms [Baltag
and Moss, 2004, p. 214]. It is therefore mainly a variant of
the tableau method of classical multi-modal logic Kn. Even
if we know that tr blows up exponentially the size of the
input formula, the computational complexity of this tableau
method is not studied. In this section, we review the existing
results about computational complexity of DEL.
5.1.1 Public Announcement Logic (PAL)
Public Announcement Logic (PAL) [Plaza, 1989] is an ex-
tension of epistemic logic with a dynamic operator [ψ!]ϕ
whose truth conditions are defined as follows:
M, w |= [ψ!]ϕ iff M, w |= ψ implies Mψ, w |= ϕ
where Mψ is the restriction of M to the worlds which sat-
isfy ψ. PAL is a fragment of DEL: the language of PAL is
LDEL restricted to event models consisting of a single pos-
sible event with reflexive arrows for all agents. There is a
gap between PAL and DEL in terms of computational com-
plexity, both for the model checking problem and the satis-
fiability problem. Indeed, the model checking of PAL is in
P (also with common belief) [van Benthem and Kooi, 2004]
and the satisfiability problem for PAL is PSPACE-complete
[Lutz, 2006]. Despite the fact that there exist reduction
axioms for PAL, it is difficult to implement a direct trans-
lation using reduction axioms. In fact, there are properties
that can be expressed exponentially more succinctly in PAL
than in epistemic logic [French et al., 2011]. Note that there
exist PSPACE tableau methods for solving the satisfiability
problem in PAL [de Boer, 2007, Balbiani et al., 2010].
5.1.2 DEL-sequents
DEL-sequents [Aucher, 2011] are triples of the form ϕ,ϕ′ |=
ϕ′′ where ϕ,ϕ′′ ∈ LEL and ϕ′ is a formula of a language for
event models. A DEL-sequent ϕ,ϕ′ |= ϕ′′ holds when for all
pointed epistemic model (M, w) such that M, w |= ϕ, for
all pointed event model (M′, w′) such that M′, w′ |= ϕ′, if
(M′, w′) is executable in (M, w), then M⊗M′, (w,w′) |=
ϕ′′. The problem of determining whether a DEL-sequent
holds is NEXPTIME-complete and there exists a tableau
method for it. DEL-sequents have been generalized to se-
quences of the form ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn i
1
ψ and ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1,
. . . , ϕ′n, ϕn i
2
ψ′. The corresponding satisfiability problem
is also NEXPTIME-complete [Aucher et al., 2012].
5.1.3 The sequence and ‘star’ iteration operators
The sequence and ‘star’ iteration operators are construc-
tions enabling to build complex programs as in Propositional
Dynamic Logic (PDL [Harel et al., 2000]). The truth condi-
tions are defined as follows:
M, w |= [π; γ]ϕ iff M, w |= [π][γ]ϕ
M, w |= [π∗]ϕ iff there is a finite sequence π; . . . ;π
such that M, w |= [π; . . . ;π]ϕ
We do not know about the computational complexity of
the model-checking problem when the operator [π∗]ϕ is added
to the language. In fact, we do not even know whether it is
decidable. The computational complexity of the satisfiabil-
ity problem remains the same when the sequential compo-
sition operator is added. However, adding a ‘star’ operator
makes the satisfiability problem undecidable. This result is
not really surprising, it is a direct corollary of the result of
[Miller and Moss, 2005] stating that Public Announcement
Logic with the ‘star’ operator is already undecidable.
5.1.4 The common belief operator
We may extend the language with the common belief op-
erator CGϕ, where G ⊆ AGT. The truth conditions are
defined as follows:
M, w |= CGϕ iff for all v ∈
( ⋃
a∈G
Ra
)+
(w),M, v |= ϕ
Intuitively, CGϕ is an abbreviation of an infinite conjunc-
tion [Fagin et al., 1995]: CGϕ = E
1
Gϕ ∧ E2Gϕ ∧ E3Gϕ ∧ . . .,
where EkGϕ is defined inductively as follows: E
1
Gϕ =
∧
a∈G
Baϕ
and Ek+1G ϕ = E
1
GE
k
Gϕ.
We do not know about the computational complexity of
the satisfiability problem when the common belief operator
is added to the language LDEL. However, we know that
it is decidable and that the language with common belief
operator is more expressive than the epistemic language LEL
with common belief [Baltag et al., 1998, Baltag et al., 1999].
5.2 Implementation
There exist two implementations of our decision problems:
1. The model-checker DEMO [van Eijck, 2007], standing
for Dynamic Epistemic MOdeling tool, can evaluate formu-
las of LDEL in epistemic models, display graphically epis-
temic models, event models and updates of epistemic models
by event models, translate formulas of LDEL to formulas of
PDL. DEMO is written in Haskel and has been applied in
[van Ditmarsch et al., 2005] and [van Ditmarsch et al., 2006].
Also, it has been used to investigate the pros and cons of
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modeling some well-known problems of computer security
within the DEL framework [van Eijck and Orzan, 2007].
2. The program Aximo [Richards and Sadrzadeh, 2009],
written in C++, implements an algorithm for proving prop-
erties of interactive multi-agent scenarios encoded in epis-
temic systems. Epistemic systems provide an algebraic se-
mantics to DEL and were developed together with a sound
and complete sequent calculus [Baltag et al., 2007].
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our work contributes to the proof theory and the study
of the computational complexity of DEL, which has been
rather neglected so far. Although our results show that
our decision problems are not tractable, it turns out that
the DEMO implementation does not fare worse and often
even better in terms of time of execution than other model-
checkers modeling the same problems, without resorting to
the DEL methodology [van Ditmarsch et al., 2006].
We still need to investigate whether or not the computa-
tional complexity remains the same when we consider other
epistemic logics as the basis of DEL, such as S5. Moreover,
our results rely on the fact that we use the union operator
in the language, an open problem is to obtain similar results
without this operator. Finally, we plan to implement our
tableau method in LotrecScheme [Schwarzentruber, 2011].
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